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Social and cultural drivers of incentive effectiveness 
in infrastructure projects 
Timothy M. Rose1, Leentje Volker2  
Abstract 
Formal incentives systems aim to encourage improved performance by offering a reward for 
the achievement of project-specific goals. Despite argued benefits of incentive systems on 
project delivery outcomes, there remains debate over how incentive systems can be 
designed to encourage the formation of strong project relationships within a complex social 
system such as an infrastructure project. This challenge is compounded by the increasing 
emphasis in construction management research on the important mediating influence of 
technical and organisational context on project performance. In light of this challenge, the 
research presented in this paper focuses on the design of incentive systems in four 
infrastructure projects: two road reconstructions in the Netherlands and two building 
constructions in Australia. Based on a motivational theory frame, a cross case analysis is 
conducted to examine differences and similarities across social and cultural drivers 
impacting on the effectiveness of the incentive systems in light of infrastructure project 
context.  
Despite significant differences in case project characteristics, results indicate the projects’ 
experience similar social drivers impacting on incentive effectiveness. Significant value 
across the projects was placed on: varied performance goals and multiple opportunities to 
across the project team to pursue incentive rewards; fair risk allocation across contract 
parties; value-driven tender selection; improved design-build integration; and promotion of 
future work opportunities. However, differences across the contexts were identified. Results 
suggest future work opportunities were a more powerful social driver in upholding reputation 
and establishing strong project relationships in the Australian context. On the other hand, 
the relationship initiatives in the Dutch context seemed to be more broadly embraced 
resulting in a greater willingness to collaboratively manage project risk. Although there are 
limitations with this research in drawing generalizations across two sets of case projects, the 
results provide a strong base to explore the social and cultural influences on incentive 
effectiveness across different geographical and contextual boundaries in future research.  
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1. Introduction 
Internationally, construction industries are faced with rapid globalisation requiring new 
governance structures to bridge the gap between social, legal and cultural work practices, to 
efficiently manage global supply chains. A major emerging issue in the procurement of 
infrastructure internationally is the need for greater emphasis on integrated delivery 
incorporating vertically and horizontally integrated construction organisations (Levitt 2007; 
Renier, Volker et al. 2009). This has led to the recent developments in integrated 
governance mechanisms including alternative financing and delivery arrangements such as 
Alliancing and Public-Private Partnerships. Advances in the areas of integrated 
design/construction and asset management systems (e.g. Building Information Modelling), 
vertically integrated supply chain networks (e.g. strategic alliancing) and alternative project 
procurement and financing arrangements offer opportunities to improve construction sector 
productivity (Roehrich and Lewis 2010). 
Similarly, increased global competition across industry firms has seen greater emphasis 
placed on innovation offering more effective ways to compete and achieve greater value for 
money. However, there remain major challenges in enhancing infrastructure project 
performance within a highly complex (and unique) multi-firm production model. This model is 
characterised by fragmented supply chains, typically resulting in disjointed relationships 
across project networks (Rose and Manley 2012). However, it is also characterised by highly 
interdependent project outputs. Under these conditions, a key challenge faced by project 
leaders is how to effectively align formal and informal governance arrangements in a 
complimentary way (Hinze 1994; Gann and Salter 2000; London 2001). According to Miozzo 
and Dewick (2002), the strength and capacity of project-based organisations to increase 
competitive advantage and encourage innovation is driven by: 1) the management and 
structure of ownership of the contractor; 2) the creation of inter-firm institutions to facilitate 
innovation diffusion, while maximising firm-specific competencies; and 3) established 
relationships and collaboration between organisations and external knowledge sources. 
Thus, project performance and innovation is argued to be governed partly by the nature of 
the project delivery approach and more specifically, by how the delivery approach may 
encourage or discourage the formation of a coherent and coordinated ‘project organisation’. 
In light of the argument that incentive systems need to be carefully applied to suit specific 
project context, this paper explores the nature of attitudes and motivations of contracted 
parties towards incentive goal achievement across culturally and organisationally varied 
environments. The authors compare the effectiveness of incentive systems to motivate 
contracted parties towards incentive goals across four broadly different infrastructure 
projects: two road reconstructions in the Netherlands and two building constructions in 
Australia. This comparative analysis aims to provide guidance for improving the 
effectiveness of incentive systems to promote project performance by deriving similarities 
and differences across the Australian and Dutch contexts. Secondly, the paper explores the 
nature of shared social drivers that influence the effectiveness of incentive systems. The 
paper now presents our theoretical constructs that underpin incentive motivation and the 
drivers of financial incentive motivation in construction projects to be explored in the case 
studies that follow.  
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 Motivation 
Incentives offered in construction projects aim to increase motivation and commitment of 
project stakeholder towards above ‘business as usual’ performance. Broadly, their 
effectiveness to induce motivation is founded on principles of work motivation theories. Work 
motivation can be defined as a set of external and internal energetic forces that initiate work-
related behaviour and determine its form, intensity, direction and duration. Reward systems 
such incentives impact on motivation, which in turn determines effort and ultimately 
performance (Van Herpen, Van Praag et al. 2002). Although there are a wide range of 
motivation theories, three key theoretical constructs are argued to usefully inform the nature 
of incentive systems on construction projects. They comprise Justice, Goal Commitment and 
Social Preferences/Reciprocity Theory.   
The perception of fairness (or justice) regarding how and what decisions are made about 
reward systems can significantly affect motivation toward reward goals. Justice theories 
(Colquitt 2004) identify three different aspects: fairness of decision outcomes or distributive 
justice, justice of the decision-making processes that lead to decision outcomes (procedural 
justice), and interactional justice relating to aspects of the communication process between 
reward providers and recipients, such as honesty and respect. As an extension to goal-
setting, goal commitment (Hollenbeck and Klein 1987) refers to the sustained determination 
and motivation to try for an incentive goal – suggesting the way the goals of an incentive are 
managed over time will impact motivation and commitment. Key antecedents of goal 
commitment are those that impact on the attractiveness of goal attainment and those that 
impact on the expectancy of goal attainment (Hollenbeck and Klein 1987). Similar to 
interaction justice, economic reciprocity theory states contract agents prefer a condition of 
fairness in their exchange relationship. Depending on shared behaviour, the value of a 
financial reward can be perceived to be positive or negative. Thus, if the incentive’s intention 
is perceived to be as ‘calculative’ or hostile, parties may view the incentive negatively, which 
can lead to a hostile response (Fehr and Falk 2002).  
2.2 Incentive contracting 
As a part of procurement, conditions of contract allocate the responsibilities and liabilities of 
each contracting party, and define contractual risk and reward. Although the clear definition 
of responsibilities in the conditions of contract encourage efficient management of risks 
during construction, the attitudes and motivations of contracted parties towards risk, 
facilitated through strong relationships and co-operative teamwork, are important for high 
project performance (Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2002). A common approach in to aligning 
the attitudes and motivations of contracted parties and improve the balance between project 
risk and reward for performance is through incentive contracting. Simply, incentive 
contracting provides the opportunity for contract parties to earn additional profit for higher 
performance (Bower, Ashby et al. 2002), and focus on client gain-sharing by providing a 
share in the client’s success from a project. 
Financial incentives can be combined with any type of base construction contract and can be 
designed to reward the achievement of a wide range of project objectives depending on the 
specific project. Generally, incentives are structured through: 1) the method of payment of 
the contract price, 2) a profit sharing (cost-plus) incentive arrangement, and  3) a 
performance bonus (Rose and Manley, 2011),. The use of incentives aligns the contractor’s 
objective with the client’s expectations and ensures that contracted parties pay attention to 
the issues that are important for the client. Commonly, positive project performance 
incentives are used along with disincentives (penalties). However, to ensure that an 
adversarial relationship does not occur between the contracting parties, the incentive 
systems should focus on positive incentives, rather than penalties (Lahdenpera and 
Koppinen 2003). 
2.3 Social and cultural contextual drivers 
The effectiveness of incentive systems to promote effort towards client goals is highly 
sensitive to the context in which it is applied (Bresnen and Marshall 2000), making them 
highly challenging to design and implement. Effective design and implementation require a 
clear understanding of not only the incentive mechanism, but also the context in which it is 
implemented. Thus, if a financial incentive is not carefully designed to suit its context, it may 
induce undesired behaviour, inhibiting the formation of the trust and cooperation (Rose and 
Manley 2011). As incentive systems are inherently formal in nature, a key challenge faced 
by incentive designers is to align the formal incentive systems with informal governance 
arrangements in a complimentary way.  
The effectiveness of incentive systems to encourage high performance is also influenced by 
social and cultural organisational drivers, establishing ‘behavioural’ norms in response to 
governance arrangements. Broadly, social and cultural norms are expected to influence the 
strength of inter-organisational relationships in the context of an infrastructure project. 
Cultural attitudes of interrelated project organizations are also seen to significantly influence 
the diffusion and uptake of innovative ideas in construction (Hartmann 2006). Broadly, 
cultural and social norms define perceptions of behaviour and altitudes of project parties 
about each other’s intentions, including their trustworthiness. In the case of financial 
incentives, this can influence how project participants perceive the intention behind a formal 
incentive system.  
Cultural norms can be defined at both an industry and project level and are closely 
interrelated. For example, cultural norms can define contract parties’ independence, 
orientation towards rationality, willingness to communicate openly, and risk and conflict 
adverseness. Similarly, differences in national cultures defined by geographical boundaries 
can influence perceived intentions and expectations of behaviour. Thus, from an individual 
perspective, cognition, emotion, and motivation can be widely influenced by cultural norms, 
for example, the strikingly different construal’s between western and non-western self-
perception. Although there are clearly incremental levels across countries, the western 
culture perception of self is defined by individuals who are independent, self-contained and 
autonomous, while non-western normative imperative is for individuals to maintain a 
fundamental connectedness and interdependence (Markus and Kitayama 1991). Without 
going into the highly detailed description of the differences across international cultures, 
these types of behavioural norms can heavily influence self-perceptions, and thus, impact on 
the effectiveness of organisational systems. This is certainly the case in construction, where 
the indirect influence of cultural norms can cause difficulties with institutional mismatching 
across international organisational boundaries resulting in high transaction costs and conflict 
(Levitt 2007). Further, business cultures that place greater emphasis on connectedness and 
interdependence may generally have a greater tenancy towards teamwork and are less 
antagonistic and adversarial.  
3. Methods  
Case studies were seen as the best method given the complexity of project environments, 
and the need for in-depth understanding of the dynamics surrounding project-based 
motivation in order to effectively scope and identify the social and cultural drivers 
(Edmondson and McManus 2007; Easton 2010). In this paper, a comparison is made of the 
social and cultural drivers seen to promote or inhibit motivation towards incentive goals of 
four integrated Design and Build cases in public infrastructure: two road reconstructions in 
the Netherlands and two building constructions in Australia. For this study each of the 
authors selected two cases that were collected in their country of origin in the context of 
independent research projects. The selection of the cases can be considered as revelatory 
since they originate from a different research context and types of infrastructure. Yet, all four 
cases share the same innovative and incentive based character. This provided a rich data 
set to compare and contrast the differences in project types and the nature of project 
delivery (including the cultural and social differences) across the cases, while maintaining 
the character of the incentive system relatively constant. 
In each case study, the client and head contractor involved in the procurement and design 
stages of the case projects were interviewed. Two people from each of party were 
interviewed on each project, ranging from 60 to 90 minutes duration and based on semi-
structured questioning. The semi-structured interviews involved general questions about the 
project characteristics and the stage outcomes (e.g. Where there any constraints in the 
design stage that effected performance towards incentivised goals?), followed by questions 
relating to distributive and procedural justice, goal commitment and social preferences as 
important motivation constructs. Example questions relating to the motivation constructs 
included ‘Did you see value in pursuing the incentive goal? Where you involved in the goal 
setting process? (Goal Commitment); What influenced your perception that the incentive 
reward on offer was fair/ unfair in relation to pursuing project goals? (Justice); Did you feel 
the underlying intention of the incentive was honourable and fair? (Social Preferences). 
Apart from a comparison of the contractual agreements and case details, the cases were 
compared based on incentive characteristics seen to impact on the effectiveness of the 
design and implementation of incentive systems based on Rose (2008). This paper focuses 
on aspects that relate to the selection and design phase of the projects. These incentive 
characteristics were unpacked across each case to identify differences and similarities in 
how the incentives were designed and applied; and the nature of the social and cultural 
drivers perceived to influence incentive goal effectiveness. The incentive characteristics 
explored in this paper are as follows: 
1. Incentive goal and reward opportunities: the range of goals covering key project priorities 
and the nature of the incentive reward on offer across project stakeholders.  
2. Design and build integration: the involvement of project parties, particularly the 
contractor, in the design process and integration with construction. 
3. Risk allocation: how design and construction risk is allocated under the base contract. 
4. Value-driven tender: the nature of the tender selection process in promoting ‘value’ 
selection. 
5. Future work: project stakeholder opportunities for future work. 
Each case project was treated as an independent study which was subsequently subjected 
to cross-case analysis under the previous headings. Throughout data analysis and reporting 
the authors were frequently cross referenced between the interpretation and the original 
data. They regularly contacted each other to discuss the framework and share a common 
understanding about the cases and its context. This process can be characterised as ex 
ante use of theory in qualitative research. The general aim of this approach is ‘not to build 
consensus aiming diverging theoretical perspectives but rather to use their divergences as 
vantage points for creating new insights’ (Andersen and Kragh 2010, p. 53). This approach 
suited the study since the research focused on the commonalities and differences between 
the four cases and two countries.   
The four cases comprised: Brisbane Magistrates Courts project (A1) and the Lyell McEwin 
Health Redevelopment project (A2) where social infrastructure (building) projects delivered 
in Australia, while Highway package F (D1) and Highway A12 (D2) were civil infrastructure 
projects delivered in the Netherlands. Further case project details and the incentive 
characteristics can be found in Volker and Rose (2012). 
4. Findings on Incentive Drivers  
The incentive characteristics identified from the case studies are now compared to identify 
social and cultural organisational drivers seen to impact on incentive effectiveness across 
the case contexts in the selection and design phase of the projects. The five incentive 
characteristics are: incentive goal and reward opportunities, design and build integration, risk 
allocation, value driven tender, and future work.    
4.1 Incentive goal and reward opportunities 
4.1.1 Multiple goal opportunities 
Case A2, D1 and D2 had a wide range of performance goals and multiple opportunities to 
secure the financial incentive, resulting in improved level of motivation. This also was seen 
to encourage teamwork as goal achievement required effort from a wider range of project 
participants across multiple goals. This induced a team mentality towards goal achievement 
(high interdependency and a social expectation for achievement) in the Dutch cases and A2, 
which was not present in A1. These research findings indicate the importance to clearly 
define the project goals at the early stages of the project, and ‘balance’ incentive goal 
parameters to prevent overemphasis on particular goals. The client in the Dutch situation 
applied several innovative procurement methods (e.g. best value procurement, listing the 
risks and key performance indicators), which enabled both the client and the contractor to 
better define the project goals in a relatively early phase of the project and improved the 
sensemaking processes between the client and the contractor. The bidders also made a 
more explicit choice to aim for the financial bonuses. In all projects, communication about 
common goals stimulated the development of a collaborative culture from the beginning of a 
project. During the interviews, examples were mentioned of situations in which both parties 
were willing to take the blame in situations where unexpected events threatened the 
achievement of an incentivised goal.  
4.1.2 Incentive distribution equality 
The research findings indicate the importance in offering the incentive reward to those 
parties expected to contribute to overall performance in key project priority areas. Equality in 
how incentive rewards are distributed based on performance contribution was perceived to 
be  an important social driver and such expectations were defined at the early project stages 
in A2 and the Dutch cases. In the case of A2, the project participants valued the client’s 
decision to allow the project team to decide how the incentive amount would be distributed. 
Project parties jointly agreed during the design development stage that the bonus pool would 
be distributed according to fee proportions, an equitable offer for those parties involved. This 
was also part of the best value procurement approach, which is a specific dialogue-based  
tender procedure. This tender was less formalised and more open than the competitive 
dialogue procedure, yet both leading to a commonly accepted risk perception and 
consensus on the assignment and related rewards. The payment structure and the level of 
bonuses and penalties were primarily determined by the client in D1 and D2. On the other 
hand, A1 only offered the incentive reward to the managing contractor to the disappointment 
of consultants and key subcontractors who were seen to contribute to pursuing stretched 
scope incentive goals. By setting multiple goals and levels of reward across the project, 
clients can ensure goals remain achievable, teamwork is fostered through joint commitment, 
and credit is given for partial success. 
4.2 Design and build integration 
4.2.1 Early involvement of key stakeholders in design 
The results of project A2 and D2 indicate a strong emphasis on integrated design build 
contracts contributes significantly to timely and cost efficient project delivery. According to 
the A2 project client, the early involvement of contractors assisted the team to “find building 
smarts that would improve the value of the project” - and gave ”a good indication of what [the 
team] were aiming for in terms of cost reduction”. This was also seen to improve the level of 
collaboration. Project A2 also uniquely involved key subcontractors in the design stage, 
which was seen to improve the managing contractor’s effectiveness in identifying value-
added design options. The tender dialogue in D2 encouraging the discussion of concept 
designs with the client and award based on the expected traffic flows, sustainability and level 
of stakeholder inconvenience. This introduced discussion about innovative construction 
methods to increase the construction speed. The client contract manager indicated that 
“most of the questions related to the qualitative elements instead of the bolt and nuts” which 
shows a different focus by the bidders.  
4.2.2 Emphasis on design-build collaboration 
A difference between the Netherlands civil and Australian building case projects was the 
increased emphasis on the design quality in building projects in comparison to road 
infrastructure. As such, participants involved in the building projects placed greater emphasis 
on the involvement of the contractor and key subcontractors in the design stage, as design 
discrepancy risks can be potentially higher in building projects in comparison to civil road 
projects. However, this did not discount the impact of design integration on improving project 
collaboration. In fact, improved definition of project objectives and constraints through input 
from multi-disciplinary experts in design commonly assisted with value and risk 
management. This led to more stable cost calculations and satisfying incentive goals. It also 
provided the opportunity to build project relationships earlier, improving motivation towards 
incentive goals. Greater emphasis on design build integration created significant change in 
the regular operating environment for the contractor of D2.  According to the D2 project 
leader “it seems as if the time has finally come to accept the benefits of integrated design 
deliveries”. 
4.3 Risk allocation 
4.3.1 Willingness to share cost overrun risk 
In all cases the allocation of risk under contract arrangements impacted on the 
implementation of the incentives. In case A1, the managing contractor took on a greater 
share of construction cost risk in comparison to A2 under different contract forms. According 
to the participants involved in project A2, the client’s willingness to share construction cost 
risk was seen to improve the managing contractors’ ability to achieve the incentive goals, as 
they were less likely to be focused on their own financial liabilities, and more likely to 
perceive the client behaviour as fair. For example, the managing contractor perceived the 
client’s willingness to share construction risk “broke down the ‘us versus them’ attitude which 
is prevalent in [traditional] contracts and focused our joint attention on achieving the project 
goals.” This perception of justice was an important social driver for developing the project 
relationship and thus, promoting motivation towards the project goals. On the other hand, the 
A1 project participants acknowledged that the contractor resorted to a self-protective position 
due to their high risk liability, partly resulting in an unwillingness to pursue the stretched 
scope incentive goals. 
4.3.2 Perception of risk assurance and project culture 
In the tender phase of D2, a list of previously identified risks and opportunities were made 
available. According to the project leader, the contractor tenderers could decide which of 
these risks were to be included in their job description. After submission of the final bids, it 
appeared most of the contractors accepted the majority of the items. This was probably due 
to the level of competition in the market and the expectation that other contractors would 
also accept the majority of the risk. Project D1 included a shared risk fund. In case of 
unexpected events, the contractor was allowed to solve the problems based on actual costs 
+5% cost mark-up. The contractor was entitled to 25% of the remainder of this fund after 
delivery of the project. In this way, the contractor was stimulated to create preventive 
measures in the early phase of the project that would leave the risk fund untouched, which 
occurred. The results indicate that this risk fund contributed to the project culture in which 
not every detail and possible additional costs were discussed. Yet, in D2 the client project 
leader indicated that hardly any unforeseen costs were filed: “apparently you don’t need a 
shared risk fund if the arrangements are just”. This was an interesting finding in comparison 
to the Australian cases, as the bidders was offered the opportunity to define the level of risk 
to be taken as part of their job description during tender, thus encouraging a level of fairness 
(justice) in their initial dealings. Also, the shared risk fund promoted a positive project culture 
through the perception that if difficulties arose funds were available, despite most of the risk 
taken on by the appointed contractor. In contrast, the Australian cases indicated contractors 
took a protectionist view of risk. This may be due to cultural differences across the two 
industries, however, likely related to how conducive the project environment was towards 
defining and managing risk across the two sets of case projects. 
4.4 Value-driven tender 
4.4.1 Non-price selection criteria 
All case projects involved some form of non-price criteria that encouraged selection based 
on value in comparison to price alone. Both A1 and A2 had relatively high non-price 
proponents, with project A1 affording a 30% price and 70% non-price split, and project A2 
with a two-stage 40% price and 60% non-price split. Non price criteria included proven past 
performance and ability; resource strategy; project methodology; commitment to relationship 
management; and community consultation. In D1 the price/quality ratio was 30/70, in which 
the quality included the allocated risks, offered opportunities, planning, and capabilities key 
project personnel - tested during an interview. This resulted in a selection process with a 
high level of information exchange between client and bidder. Although the bidders were 
nervous about the qualitative aspects of tender judgements in D2, they placed importance 
on information exchange during the tender to build a successful project relationship. This 
was similar to the Australian cases where the currency of accurate informal information 
during the tender stage was also seen as an important social driver to building project 
relationships. 
4.4.2 Alignment of ambitions 
The results of all cases indicate that the selection of project participants based on their ability 
to add value to the project (rather than the traditional price-focused tender selection) 
increased the project participants’ expectations that incentive goals could be achieved, 
promoting commitment. This was also seen to encourage a willingness to align with the team 
objectives and meet the client expectations by which they were selected. In the Australian 
cases this was seen as an important social driver as the contractor and consultants felt “an 
obligation to prove [they had been] rightly appointed” to deliver this important and highly 
visible social infrastructure project. The Dutch projects were part of publicly announced 
improvement trajectories in the road network as  part of an economic stimulation measure. 
This commitment to high performance was reflected through all project team leaders, who 
had a personal stake in achieving the higher order project goals. In some cases the project 
leaders were specifically selected to match the value-based culture of the project. This 
showed that the drivers of the project organisation were strongly embedded in the 
organisational and social context of the organisations involved.  
4.5 Future work 
4.5.1 Long-term business relationships 
Future work is a powerful performance driver that seems to be becoming increasingly 
important in the global construction industry. The results from the Australian cases identified 
that due to a highly competitive local building construction market the desire to uphold and 
improve reputation, so as to increase future commercial opportunities, was a strong social 
motivator to maintain business relationships with the client and pursue incentive goals. This 
was particularly relevant to public infrastructure projects, where state governments are major 
repeat clients. It is likely that the desire to strengthen reputation with these clients would be 
stronger than with clients who are less likely to provide further work opportunities. The was 
particularly evident in the project outcomes for project A2, where the key project participants 
were offered the opportunity to be reappointed to on-going stages of the hospital 
redevelopment program if they achieved high performance. This strongly intensified the 
desire to achieve the incentive targets outside the financial reward on offer where the 
contractor was “driven to maintain the good relationship with the government client so [they] 
would be looked on favourably in future projects…as valued reward outside the [financial] 
incentives.”  
4.5.2 Need for transparency and integrity  
In the Dutch context, D1 and D2 were part of a strategic governmental program to support 
the construction industry surviving the recent credit crunch. For these relatively large 
projects, there are a small number of competent players in the field. Therefore, the client 
decided not to exclude any party in the bidding process. However, the market situation has 
changed dramatically over the last few years. This has resulted in construction companies 
placing great importance on future work opportunities to remain buoyant, even accepting 
lower profit margins to do so. Additionally, the procurement obligations have increased the 
urge for transparency and objectivity. This had led to a greater need for quality and service 
assurance within running contracts and a strong preference for long term integrated 
contracts which include performance based maintenance agreements, such as 25-year 
Design Build Finance and Maintain (DBFM) contracts and regional asset management 
responsibilities for 5 to 10 years. These long term commitments stretch the evaluation period 
of projects, but also increase the size of projects while limiting the amount of new projects. 
This caused an increase of activities and accompanying responsibilities that are outsourced 
to market parties. In a sense, long term contracts can be considered as future work 
assurance as well. These arrangements require greater transparency in collaboration and 
performance measurement, relating to improved reciprocity among both parties.   
In the Australian cases, future work opportunity was a highly influential organisational driver, 
seen to increase the effectiveness of the incentive system. This response was driven by 
increased levels of distributive justice, where contractors’ could clearly see if they achieved 
high performance (achievement of incentive goals) it was likely to translate into future work 
opportunities. The contractor on A2 was also driven by reciprocity reflected in commitment to 
their client through the client’s offer to re-appoint them for on-going construction stages. This 
direct link was not a prevalent in the Dutch cases. This may have been due to the localised 
nature of the construction industry in Australia, where future work is strongly driven by 
informal relationships. This may reinforce the need to maintain strong client-contractor 
relationships and uphold reputation as a social driver embedded in industry culture. 
Currently in the Netherlands, informal relationships in the construction industry are publicly 
condemned since a major fraud case was revealed in 2001, badly damaging the reputation 
of the construction industry. The need for strong client-contractor relationship in the 
Netherlands originates from the character of the long-term integrated contracts. Moreover, 
the Dutch road, rail and governmental building agencies have recently focused on 
developing a joint past performance assessment system with the aim to further develop this 
as a performance driver, as well as a quality assurance mechanism.   
5. Conclusions and discussion 
Incentive reward systems should be fairly applied so that rewards and measurement 
processes illicit their desired behaviours in light of the project environment. These shared 
behaviours can heavily influence the establishment of collaboration and trustworthiness in 
on-going project relationships, acknowledging that project participants will be more likely to 
cooperate voluntarily and reciprocate positive behaviour if they jointly perceive an incentive 
intention is fair, honourable and recognise high performance. As such, the use of incentives 
introduces complex social and cultural organisational dynamics that impact on effectiveness 
i.e. their ability to promote motivation towards higher order project goals. These complex 
dynamics result in challenges for infrastructure project leaders, particularly due to the highly 
sensitive of incentives to the context in which it is applied.  
Effective incentive design thus requires a clear understanding of the impact of different 
delivery strategies and social and cultural contexts on incentive goal motivation. Drawing on 
the results of two Australian social infrastructure (building) case projects and two civil (road) 
infrastructure projects from the Netherlands, differences and similarities in key social and 
cultural drivers were explored. This research focused on the selection and design phase of 
these projects, with particular emphasis on aspects of the incentive design and broader 
procurement approach that drive motivation and commitment towards incentivised goals 
early in a project. Despite significant differences in the project characteristics across the two 
countries, results indicate they experience similar social drivers impacting on the incentive 
effectiveness. Case results identified that contract parties saw the incentive as a commercial 
opportunity to increase their profit margins, but also acknowledged the influence project and 
relationship management processes had on their commitment to the project and pride in the 
achievement of project goals in light of the social environment. This was consistent across 
the two countries and across the two types of projects. This suggests these processes, 
particularly the value driven procurement initiatives, enhanced the collaborative environment 
between client and contractor and increased the predictability of the risks, intensifying the 
motivational effect of the incentives on offer.  
Despite these common themes, there were two notable differences across the Australian 
and Dutch contexts. They related to differences in how contract parties perceived future 
work as a driver to forge on-going project relationships; and differences in how risk in 
pursing project goals was perceived and managed. Firstly, future work opportunities were 
identified to be a more prevalent social driver in the Australian building context due to a 
highly competitive building construction market in comparison to the Dutch market, who have 
limited amount of players in road construction. This has induced an Australian industry 
culture driven by local relationships, reinforcing the need to maintain a strong reputation in 
the market to maintain competitiveness. Although this was not as prevalent in the Dutch 
cases, several Dutch agencies have recently focused on developing assessment systems 
based on previous performance with the aim to further develop this as a performance driver 
and act as quality insurance measure. Secondly, case results indicate there were differences 
in how contract parties responded to project risk. Contractors in the Dutch context seemed to 
more broadly pursue an open book approach in fairly defining and managing risk, while in 
the Australian context contractors took a ‘hard-line’ protectionist view of risk. Although 
difficult to generalise across a small sample, this may be due to greater willingness of Dutch 
project participants to embrace an innovative collaborative project culture with clear tasks 
and responsibilities. On the other hand, this also may be due to how conducive the project 
environment was towards defining and managing risk across the two sets of case projects. 
In summary, findings suggest multi-levelled incentives systems, value-driven procurement, 
improved design-build integration, equitable risk management and promotion of future work 
opportunities are important ingredients for developing strong project relationships, leading to 
improved project performance. Early evidence indicates these shared drivers may 
fundamentally apply across different social and cultural organisational settings. Although 
there are limitations with this research in drawing generalisations across two sets of diverse 
case projects, the results provide a strong base to explore incentive systems across a wider 
range of project types and across social and cultural boundaries in future research. As an 
early contribution to this knowledge, the research suggests if incentives are designed such 
that participants genuinely value the financial reward on offer, the incentive goals are 
perceived as achievable and the incentive is positioned within a complementary set of 
procurement initiatives that promote recognition and reward for high performance, in light of 
project context. 
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